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Leaders in both the House and the Senate have committed to “shared 
responsibility” as a basic principle of health care reform. Shared 
responsibility means the costs of health care coverage are shared by 
individuals, businesses, and the public sector. Failure to ensure that 
employers fairly share in the responsibility for providing health coverage can 
result in a “free rider” problem. Responsible employers who provide good 
jobs will share in the costs, while less responsible employers who mostly 
provide low-wage jobs with limited benefits will seek to shift their share of 
the costs to others, including taxpayers, their employees, and other 
businesses. 
 
The most efficient and equitable way to limit this kind of employer free-
riding is to require all employers to either provide affordable health 
insurance to all of their workers or to contribute to the costs of providing 
publicly subsidized affordable health insurance to uninsured workers. 
Broad-based employer responsibility of this kind is more equitable and 
efficient than an approach that allows substantial numbers of employers to 
avoid any responsibility or to limit their responsibility relative to other 
employers.  
 
Health care reform legislation passed by the House earlier this year includes 
a sensibly designed employer-responsibility provision that is consistent with 
the shared-responsibility approach and limits employer free-riding. The 
House bill gives employers the option of providing affordable health 
insurance to their workers or contributing a percentage of their payroll to 
the public sector to cover part of the costs of providing publicly subsidized 
insurance to their workers.1 
  
The version of the health bill currently being debated in the Senate also 
includes an employer responsibility provision, but the Senate provision is 
designed in a way that would make it easy for many large and profitable 
employers, particularly the ones paying poor wages, to shirk their 
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responsibilities. In essence, many large, low-wage employers could avoid paying their fair share of 
health insurance costs by shifting a portion of their share to the public, other more responsible 
businesses, and individual workers. 
 
“Shared Responsibility” Not So Shared in the Senate Bill 
Table 1 (on the next page) provides an analysis of how responsibility for health insurance costs is 
shared in the Senate bill between workers and other individuals, employers, and the public.  Under 
the Senate bill, these responsibilities vary depending on a worker’s family income and, for workers 
with family incomes between 133 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line, whether they are 
employed on a full-time or part-time basis, and whether they receive a tax credit that reduces the 
cost of premiums for insurance purchased through the new health insurance “exchange” established 
by the legislation.  
 
For employees with family incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line, there is no 
employer responsibility. Similarly, for employees with family incomes over 400 percent of the federal 
poverty line, there is no employer responsibility, although employers generally do provide health 
coverage for most employees with incomes in this range.  
 
For employees with family incomes between 133 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line, there is 
employer responsibility, but it is limited to full-time employees.2 Under the Senate bill: 1) employers 
who do not provide health insurance to their employees would pay an assessment equal to $750 per 
full-time employee (the fee would be based on the total number of full-time employees, including 
those who did not receive a premium tax credit for purchasing insurance through the exchange),3 
and 2) employers who do provide health insurance would also pay an assessment if one or more of 
their employees opted out of the employer plan because the premiums were unaffordable (more 
than 10 percent of the employee’s family income). This assessment would be equal to the lesser of 
$3,000 for each full-time employee who received a premium tax credit or $750 per full-time 
employee (including those who didn’t receive a credit).4 
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TABLE 1 
The Not-So Shared Responsibility for Health Care Coverage in the Senate Health Bill 
 Individual Responsibility Employer Responsibility Public Responsibility 
Employees with 
Family Income 
under 133 percent 
of Federal Poverty 
Line 
Individual must obtain 
qualifying health coverage.  
This requirement can be met 
by enrolling in Medicaid, 
which will be available to all 
individuals with incomes up 
to 133% of the federal poverty 
line (FPL). 
No responsibility. Public pays cost of 
Medicaid. 
Full-Time 
Employees (30 
hours or more) 
with Family Income 
Between 133-400 
percent of Federal 
Poverty Line  
Individual must obtain 
qualifying health coverage.  
 
If employee purchases 
insurance (through the 
exchange established by the 
legislation), they are eligible 
for a premium tax credit that 
would limit their premium 
payments according to a 
sliding scale that goes from 
2.8% of income for someone 
at 100% of FPL to 9.8% of 
income for those between 300 
and 400% of FPL.  
 
If an employee opts out of 
employer-provided coverage 
and purchases insurance 
through the exchange, the 
employee is only eligible for a 
premium tax credit if the 
employee’s share of premiums 
is 9.8% of their income or 
higher, or if the employer plan 
has an actuarial value of less 
than 60%. 
 
No responsibility to provide 
affordable coverage.  
 
Employers with more than 50 
full-time employees must pay 
assessment if one or more of 
their full-time employees 
receives a premium tax credit.  
 
For employers that do not offer 
health insurance, the 
assessment is equal to $750 per 
full-time employee (including 
employees who do not receive 
premium tax credits).  
 
For employers that do offer 
coverage but have one or more 
employees receiving a 
premium tax credit (because 
the coverage did not meet 
minimum standards and the 
employee opted out of it), the 
assessment is $3,000 for each 
employee receiving a tax credit 
or $750 for each full-time 
employee (including those not 
receiving credits), whichever is 
less.  
  
Public pays cost of premium 
tax credit, but cost may be 
partially or fully offset by 
penalty on employer. 
 
Public partially subsidizes 
cost of employer-provided 
insurance through 
individual tax exclusion for 
employer-provided health 
benefits. 
Part-Time 
Employees (less 
than 30 hours) with 
Family Income 
Between 133-400 
percent of Federal 
Poverty Line 
Same as above. No responsibility. Public pays cost of premium 
tax credit.  
 
Public partially subsidizes 
cost of employer-provided 
insurance through 
individual tax exclusion for 
employer-provided health 
benefits. 
Employees with 
Family Incomes 
Above 400 percent 
of FPL 
Individual must obtain 
qualifying health coverage. 
Not eligible for premium tax 
credit. 
No responsibility. Public partially subsidizes 
cost of employer-provided 
insurance through 
individual tax exclusion for 
employer-provided health 
benefits. 
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Incentives to Free Ride Created by the Senate Bill 
In general, the Senate bill would create an incentive for employers to free ride by increasing the 
number of people they employ in the “no-responsibility” categories and reduce the number of 
people they employ in the single “responsibility” category (full-time employees with a family income 
between 133 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line). The House does not create this kind of 
incentive for employers to free ride.  
 
The nature and extent of the free-rider incentive in the Senate bill would depend on whether or not 
the employer provides affordable health coverage to their employees. For employers who do not 
provide any health coverage, the most troubling incentive would be to reduce the amount of their 
assessment by reducing the share of their employees who work full time and increasing the share 
working part-time. Research conducted on Hawaii’s employer mandate, which was limited to 
employees working more than 20 hours a week, suggests that “employers’ primary response to the 
mandate was increased reliance on the exempt class of [part-time] workers …”5 The House bill 
avoids creating this kind of perverse incentive by ensuring that employers are responsible for all 
employees, not just those working above an hourly threshold set by the employer. 
 
Employers who provide health insurance that is unaffordable for some of their employees—that is, 
insurance with premiums that would cost the employee more than 9.8 percent of their income, a 
level that is likely to be exceeded for a substantial number of workers who are poorly compensated 
by their employers—will also have strong incentives to free ride.  These employers will have the 
same incentive as those who do not offer any health insurance to reduce the number of full-time 
workers and increase the number of part-time workers. Because their assessment is based on the 
number of full-time employees who receive premium tax credits for insurance purchased through 
the exchange, these employers will also have an incentive to employ workers who are likely to be 
eligible for Medicaid (ones with incomes under 133 percent of poverty) rather than workers who are 
likely to be eligible for a premium tax credit (between 133 and 400 percent of poverty). While it 
would be difficult (and almost certainly illegal) for employers to base hiring or firing decisions on a 
spouse’s income, low-wage employers could, on average, reduce their assessments by paying low 
wages that maximize the number of employees who are eligible for Medicaid. 
 
How worried should we be about this kind of an incentive to keep wage rates low enough to 
maximize Medicaid eligibility? Most households with one or more workers have family incomes 
above 133 percent of the poverty line, but a substantial number do not. According to the Census 
Bureau, some 10.5 percent of families with a worker—nearly 6 million families—had incomes below 
130 percent of the poverty line in 2008.6 This included about 2.5 million families with a member 
who worked full-time the entire year. Another 1.5 million families with a worker had incomes 
between 130 and 150 percent of poverty, including nearly 1 million families with a member who 
worked full-time the entire year.  
 
Particularly for employers in retail and other low-wage sectors, there is good reason to be concerned 
that the Senate bill would provide a significant incentive to limit wages in a way that maximizes the 
Medicaid eligibility of their workforce. The median hourly wage for the 4.4 million retail 
salespersons in the United States was $9.86 in 2008. An employee who works 34 hours a week (the 
average for a full-time worker at Wal-Mart, according to the company) at this wage will earn $17,298 
a year. Such a worker will have income under 133 percent of poverty and be eligible for Medicaid as 
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long as they have a family size of two or more and no other family income (see Table 2 for 133 
percent of poverty line by household sizes).  
 
TABLE 2 
Multiples of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), 2009 
Household Size 100% of FPL 133% of FPL 400% of FPL 
1 $10,830 $14,404 $43,320 
2 $14,570 $19.378 $58,280 
3 $18,310 $24,352 $73,240 
4 $22,050 $29,327 $88,200 
5 $25,790 $34,301 $103,160 
 
A New Incentive for Litigation 
The Senate provision would also create a new incentive for litigation by potential job applicants and 
terminated employees with family incomes between 133 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. 
This is because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment practices that have 
the effect of discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, national origin, religion, 
or sex, even if the practices are not motivated by any intent to discriminate on the basis of race of 
other protected categories. Given existing racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in income, there is 
little question that employers who try to avoid paying their fair share of costs by basing their hiring 
decisions on the income of family members of a potential employee would violate Title VII.7 Even 
in cases where employers didn’t overtly try to obtain information about spouses or other family 
members, lawsuits would be inevitable as well as costly and difficult to defend. 
 
Conclusion 
Final health care reform legislation should include employer responsibility provisions that are 
consistent with the principle of shared responsibility and do not create perverse incentives and free 
rider problems. The House bill passes this test; the Senate bill does not. 
 
                                                 
1  Small businesses with payrolls below $500,000 are exempt from employer-responsibility requirements. For larger 
employers, the employer-responsibility assessment phases in as payroll increases from $500,000 to $750,000. The 
assessment is 8 percent of  payroll for employers with payrolls over $750,000. 
2  In addition, employers with fewer than 50 full-time employees are exempt from employer-responsibility requirements. 
3  This assumes that at least one employee received a premium tax credit for insurance purchased through the exchange. 
Among employers of  more than 50 full-time employers who do not offer health insurance, this condition will almost 
always be satisfied.  
4  A somewhat different set of  assessments would apply to employers who provide health insurance but with a waiting 
period of  more than 30 days. 
5  Buckmuller, Tom, John DiNardo, and Rob Valletta.“Employer Health Benefits and Insurance Expansions: Hawaii’s 
Experience,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, June 29, 2009, 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2009/el2009-21.html. 
6  Census Bureau, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table POV14: Families by Householder’s Work Experience 
and Family Structure: 2008. 
7  Title VII also prohibits decisions to hire based on whether or not someone is a sole income earner in a two-parent 
family or a single parent, if the decisions have a disparate impact on a protected class. 
